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What is the role of non-state actors—corporate and civic—in influencing and redirecting 
regulatory reforms? How do critical junctures like financial crises change interest group 
dynamics? Focusing on financial consumer protection reforms across the Atlantic, this essay 
discusses the role of civil society actors in bringing about policy change that runs counter the 
traditional capture narrative in the literature on financial regulatory reform. In light of the 
2008 financial crisis, policymakers in the European Union (EU) and the United States turned 
their attention to financial consumer protection (FCP) and adopted a range of policy measures 
in response to crisis-related failures. The U.S. financial reform overhaul established a new 
federal agency solely responsible for consumer protection, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB). At the same time, the European Commission (EC) brought forward a policy 
package, including new supervisory authorities, which changed the institutional design of 
FCP in the EU. This essay will address the similarities and differences in FCP reforms across 
the Atlantic. Industry efforts clearly failed to prevent the increased consumer protection focus 
by policymakers and regulators. The discussion will highlight the role of weak and diffuse 
interests such as consumer, labor, and grass-roots groups and their ability to forge legitimizing 
coalitions with policymakers to bring about more consumer-friendly regulations, despite 
having fewer resources at their disposal to tackle the high complexity of financial regulatory 
issues and the continuing lobbying efforts by the financial industry. As a result, transatlantic 
financial reforms are not purely captured by high finance but reflect a compromise between 
the various interests involved. 
EU and U.S. Consumer Protection Reforms 
According to a 2010 World Bank working paper on good practices, “the need for consumer 
protection arises from an imbalance of power, information and resources between consumers 
and their financial service providers, placing consumers at a disadvantage.[1] Consumer 
protection aims to address this market failure.” According to four principles issued by the 
World Bank, a well-designed FCP framework provides the consumer with: 
1.  Transparency by providing full, plain, adequate, and comparable information about 
the prices, terms, and conditions (and inherent risks) of financial products and 
services; 
2.  Choice by ensuring fair, non-coercive, and reasonable practices in the selling and 
advertising of financial products and services, and collection of payments; 
3.  Redress by providing inexpensive and speedy mechanisms to address complaints and 
resolve disputes; and 
4. Privacy by ensuring control over access to personal financial information. 
Analysts have pinpointed failures in consumer protection as “the detonators and amplifiers in 
the recent crisis” that unfolded in 2008 and subsequently demanded more effective consumer 
protection in provision of financial products and services.[2] This analysis is largely based on 
the experience of the U.S. housing bubble, which was largely made possible by deteriorating 
mortgage origination and underwriting standards. U.S. and EU consumer groups at the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) jointly emphasized the role of lax consumer 
protection standards in the financial meltdown: “[…] strong consumer protection regulation is 
essential not only to the protection of the financial consumer interests, but also to the safety 
and soundness of our nations’ financial systems. The breakdown of our economies was 
instigated by […] dishonest and unfair consumer lending practices.”[3] This narrative 
resonated with policymakers in the U.S. and the EU who recognized the importance of 
consumer protection for the stability of the financial sector and subsequently put consumer 
finance protection at the heart of their policy response to the financial crisis. 
The EC markedly stepped up its rhetoric on increasing consumer protection in retail financial 
services. Several initiatives were undertaken at the EU level to develop useful standards or 
benchmarks on FCP in financial services. Since 2008, the EC has measured malfunctions of 
consumer protection in retail financial services with a “Consumer Markets Scoreboard.” Also 
in 2008, the European Parliament (EP) released measures to increase consumer education and 
awareness on credit and finance.[4] The Larosière Report, issued in February 2009 by an 
expert committee, was the first EU-level document that gave a comprehensive account of 
required structural changes. Based on the report, a new regime of supervisory and regulatory 
institutions came into force in January 2011, including three new European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) that work in tandem with the existing national authorities in charge of 
micro-prudential supervision.[5] The reform transformed the previous Lamfalussy Level 3 
committees into bodies with greater supervisory, rule-setting, and coordinating powers while 
day-to-day supervision remains in the hands of member state authorities. Although not quite 
comparable to the American CFPB, the ESAs have a mandate to protect consumers against 
abusive practices, with stakeholder groups representing consumer associations in all three 
organizations. The European Securities and Markets Authority, for instance, issues reports on 
consumer trends and monitors new financial activities as well as the development of common 
rules on information transparency. Analysts have commented on the retail financial services 
reforms in the EU, as marking a “conspicuous” shift in regulatory focus “from internal market 
integration towards more consumer protection issues.”[6] TACD members had been lobbying 
intensively to get FCP into the mandate of the three authorities. The European Green Party 
strongly supported civil society efforts, and several Members of the EP called for a strong 
consumer protection mandate for the new institutions.[7] Industry representatives were all but 
happy about the regulatory changes. Their lobbying efforts had clearly failed to prevent the 
EC from focusing more on consumer protection than market integration.[8] 
Consumer protection, in particular the new CFPB, was arguably the most contentious issue in 
the U.S. reform act. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (short: Dodd-
Frank) of July 2010 created an independent regulatory agency, housed in the Federal Reserve, 
with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers of financial products. In charging one 
single agency with consumer protection responsibilities, the reform succeeded in replacing a 
patchwork of different agencies, thereby consolidating and strengthening the regulation of 
consumer financial products. U.S. authorities quickly acknowledged the need for an enhanced 
FCP regime after the financial crisis. In March 2009, Sheila Bair, Chair of the U.S. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, noted: “There can no longer be any doubt about the link 
between protecting consumers from abusive products and practices and the safety and 
soundness of the financial system.[9] The consumer-friendly political environment had 
already become evident when consumer groups successfully pushed for credit card reforms in 
2009 that resulted in the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) 
Act, which has subsequently been put under the administrative authority of the CFPB. The 
Credit CARD Act of 2009 bans rate increases, prevents fee traps, and includes provisions for 
plain language disclosures in account terms.  Both regulatory reforms—the Credit CARD Act 
and the CFPB—had been pushed for by the major consumer groups first in an informal 
alliance and later as the “Americans for Financial Reform” (AFR), which brought together 
more than 250 civil society groups in a pro-reform coalition. Both pieces of legislation were a 
clear defeat for the banking lobby, which had spoken out against the CARD Act and whose 
goal had reportedly been to kill the CFPB.[10] 
Parallel to the EU and U.S. developments, consumer protection became a prominent issue on 
the G20 agenda. At the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, leaders acknowledged 
that “far more needs to be done to protect consumers, depositors, and investors against 
abusive market practices, promote high quality standards, and help ensure the world does not 
face a crisis of the scope we have seen.”[11] In November 2010, the final declaration of the 
Seoul Summit confirmed the need for enhanced FCP.[12] In response to a call by the G20 in 
February 2011, a Task Force led by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) produced “High-level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection,” 
For the first time, decision-makers agreed on international (non-binding) standards to enhance 
FCP across all financial service sectors. Sensing the political opportunity for reform, the G20 
Summit meetings had been accompanied by a “Consumers for Fair Financial Services” 
campaign organized by members of Consumers International, which had mobilized its 240 
members to lobby the G20 meetings in close cooperation with the European Consumer’s 
Bureau (BEUC) and Consumers Union, the largest European and American consumer 
associations, calling for the G20 to take action to support FCP and develop new international 
guidelines. Clearly, the pro-reform groups benefited from the post-crisis environment in 
which financial reforms took place. 
Contextual Conditions of Financial Reforms 
The sub-prime crisis as exogenous shock significantly altered the context of financial 
regulatory policymaking. In “normal times” financial regulation is an issue of interest groups 
politics characterized by relatively low public visibility.[13] The policy field is characterized 
by what Culpepper (2011), Professor of Political Science at the European University Institute, 
termed “quiet politics.”[14] In this context private sector influence is said to dominate over 
financial regulatory policy by means of several different avenues for policy influence. First, 
bankers and regulators are part of the same “transnational policy community” with the public-
private distinction becoming increasingly blurred.[15] Second, technical expertise about 
complex financial products grants industry groups privileged access to the policy process.[16] 
Traditionally, financial regulation is not only marked with issue complexity but also with 
relatively limited public attention to negotiations among regulatory agencies and bankers, 
taking place largely shielded from public debate.[17] However, crises and public outrage can 
significantly change dynamics of capture regulation. As a result of the recent financial crisis, 
regulatory reform had become susceptible to public outrage, pushing financial regulatory 
reform out of the arena of “quiet politics,” where interest group politics take place behind 
closed doors, into the arena of “noisy politics,” which forces politicians to react to public and 
interest group pressures.[18] Recent scholarly work shows that increased issue salience and 
altered social relations within the financial policy network have considerably weakened the 
industry’s capacity to veto or block reform proposals. The increased issue salience was 
accompanied by a qualitative shift in policymaking with policymakers becoming more 
reluctant to exchange information with industry groups. As a result, overall communication 
levels dropped significantly. Adjusting to these shifts, the financial industry changed its 
advocacy strategy putting more emphasis on self-regulatory moves and delaying 
implementation instead of vetoing policy proposals.[19] Hence, the contextual setting in 
which financial reforms proceeded after the sub-prime crisis was not ideal for regulatory 
capture to take place, to say the least. As a bank lobbyist in Washington put it: “When I was 
trying to get something done for the biggest banks, there was not a lot I could do.”[20] 
Civil Society Mobilization: U.S. and EU Coalitions “for Financial Reform” 
The public’s attention to a specific policy issue also has another important consequence. From 
an interest group perspective, increased salience of a policy issue changes the dynamics of 
interest groups trying to influence it, in that it levels the playing field among various actors 
and opens a policy window for new entrepreneurs.[21] Civil society groups in the U.S. and 
Europe alike clearly benefited from altered political opportunity structures and coalitions “for 
financial reform” mushroomed on both sides of the Atlantic. The crisis turned out to be a 
major catalyst for the formation of new alliances among consumer associations, trade unions, 
NGOs, and grass-roots groups. On the U.S. side, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group 
together with other NGOs and labor groups established a new and unprecedented coalition of 
labor, civil rights, small business, and senior organizations called “Americans for Financial 
Reform” (AFR). More than 250 groups joined the alliance that was formally announced in 
May 2009. Modeled after the American example, the European reform coalition “Europeans 
for Financial Reform” officially launched its campaign two months later supported by twenty-
three different groups representing several hundred European organizations. Contrary to AFR, 
a grass-roots coalition made up exclusively of civil society groups, the European Socialist 
Party, under the leadership of its president Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, together with the Green 
party organized the European reform movement in tandem with trade unions, think tanks, and 
NGOs. Starting in May 2010, U.S. and EU consumer groups also decided to come together at 
financial services conferences, to lay out common principles, and to put emphasis on the need 
for increased consumer protection. High-level EC officials attended the TACD consumer 
conferences in Ljubljana in May 2010 and Brussels in June 2011.[22] 
With the core challenge of making financial reform policy appear legitimate, consumer 
groups were at a clear advantage to the concentrated banking industry interests. Policymakers 
on both sides of the Atlantic started to reach out to consumer groups, thereby forming pro-
reform coalitions. In the EU, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services 
Michel Barnier became a strong policy entrepreneur, calling for consumer protection across 
the board. One of his first acts in office in early 2010 was to tell his staff that “a consumer 
voice had to be taken on board.”[23] Soon after, the EC started to restructure its experts 
groups and established a new Financial Services User Group (FSUG) that consists of experts 
on consumer finance from consumer groups, small retail investors, and NGOs; industry 
representatives are not allowed to participate. The group is funded by the EC, which is only 
rarely the case for advisory groups. A second politically-motivated measure initiated by 
twenty-two MEPs in an effort to establish a counter-lobby to the financial industry created a 
new NGO named “Finance Watch” in 2011. Since its creation, national parliaments and the 
EP have invited experts from Finance Watch to testify on a regular basis on financial reform 
issues. Finance Watch today is funded by the EC under a Pilot Project grant entitled 
“Capacity building of end-users and non-industry stakeholders in Union policy making in the 
area of financial services.” The activism by the European institutions in the aftermath of the 
crisis to establish a political opportunity structure has clearly helped alternative groups such 
as consumer associations to make their voices heard in the financial reform process. Political 
receptivity had changed “as day and night,” as one Brussels-based consumer advocate 
reported. At the same time, in the U.S., consumer groups have become a central interlocutor 
for the administration and the Treasury Department to draft the new financial reform bill in 
the spring of 2009. Before the Treasury published the administration’s White Paper in June 
2009, the blueprint on which the Dodd-Frank Act would be based, Michael Barr, the 
Treasury’s Assistant Secretary between 2009 and 2011, and his team had consulted several 
times with consumer groups. Moreover, one of Barr’s top staff members came from a 
consumer organization, the Center of Responsible Lending. Industry saw itself “cut out of the 
process.”[24] Looking at the White Paper, one industry representative remembered to be 
“aghast about was in it.”[25] 
This anecdotal evidence demonstrates the financial services industry’s loss of political clout 
in the post-crisis regulatory environment. In an effort to legitimize reform decisions, 
policymakers actively sided with consumer groups, which served as a new source of advice as 
well as moral authority. Demands from the new reform coalitions in favor of enhanced 
consumer protection gained moral leverage over industry arguments favoring the efficient 
market hypothesis. As a result, industry’s lobbying efforts aimed at preventing an increased 
regulatory focus on consumer protection failed. At present, the degree of regulatory capture 
seems weakened; however, doubts may well remain whether this represents a long-term 
structural change. 
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